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David Marsden* 
A Theory of Job Regulation, the Employment Relationship, 
and the Organisation of Labour Institutions** 
Industrial relations theory must be applicable to non-union workplaces, and to 
do so, it needs to start from what union and non-union workplaces have in common, 
namely, the employment relationship. This paper sketches out a proposal for the 
reconstruction of industrial relations theory based on the work rules that are 
necessary for there to be a viable employment relationship. That is, a contractual 
form which would be mutually acceptable to both workers and firms. It is argued that 
there are four basic types of work rule capable of defining acceptable limits to 
employees’ obligations within an open-ended employment relationship. These rules 
differ in whether their enforcement focuses on task- or function-centred definitions of 
job contents, and whether work is organised according to complementarities in 
production (the ‘production approach’) or to those in training (the ‘training 
approach’). These approaches give rise to different types of externalities, and so 
demand different patterns of institutionalisation. On these constrasted patterns, the 
author builds a typology of approaches to industrial relations institutions, and 
highlights the advantages and limitations of weakly institutionalised and non-union 
work relations. 
 
 
Eine Theorie der Arbeitsregulation, der Beschäftigungsverhältnisse und der 
Organisation der Arbeitsinstitutionen 
Eine gute Theorie der industriellen Beziehungen muss auch für Arbeitsplätze gelten, 
die nicht gewerkschaftlich organisiert sind. Sie sollte also solche Regeln herausarbeiten, die 
funktionsfähige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse ermöglichen, weil sie von Arbeitnehmern und 
Unternehmen akzeptiert werden. Der Aufsatz versucht dies, indem er vier Typen von Regeln 
unterscheidet, welche grundsätzlich geeignet erscheinen, akzeptable Grenzen für die 
vertraglichen Verpflichtungen von Arbeitnehmern in einen unbefristeten Arbeitsvertrag zu 
schaffen. Die Regeln unterscheiden sich danach, ob eher aufgaben- oder funktionsbezogene 
Arbeitsinhalte durchzusetzen sind, und danach, ob die Arbeitsteilung entlang von 
Produktionskomplementaritäten oder nach Maßgabe verfügbarer Qualifikationen 
geschieht. Jeder dieser vier Regelungstypen verursacht andere Externalitäten und damit 
andere Regulierungsmuster. Der Autor entwickelt eine Typologie institutionell geregelter 
Arbeitsbeziehungen und wirft Schlaglichter auf die Vor- und Nachteile gewerkschaftlich 
und nicht-gewerkschaftlich organisierter Arbeitsbeziehungen. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
* I should like to thank the participants at the 1999 meeting of the German Industrial Relations 
Association in Trier and the anonymous referees for valuable comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
** Artikel eingegangen: 15.12.1999,   
revidierte Fassung akzeptiert nach doppelt-blindem Begutachtungsverfahren: 4.9.2000. 
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1. Introduction 
In a major international comparative study, Katz and Darbishire (1999) 
demonstrate the need to re-think industrial relations theory from the bottom upwards. 
They show that among a diverse sample of advanced industrial countries there has 
been a dramatic decline in the influence of corporatist national and sectoral 
institutions, and a major shift of activity to the company and workplace levels. This is 
not the ‘end of organised industrial relations’ as some have argued pessimistically, 
but rather, a fundamental shift of focus away from macro-wage bargaining struggles 
towards job regulation. The causes are to be found in the increased exposure of 
domestic markets to international competition, and new disciplines of monetary 
control. These have simultaneously increased the pressures on firms to adopt more 
flexible structures and work patterns, and by restricting the ability of firms to pass on 
uncompetitive wage increases, they have reduced the advantages of setting wages and 
other employment conditions at national and industry levels. Such periods of 
organisational change provide insights into the underlying forces that make 
institutions function, and the relationships between them. 
Katz and Darbishire’s evidence points strongly to the need to pay greater attention 
to what they call ‘employment systems’. While there has been some ‘convergence’ 
between the seven advanced industrial countries they survey with a common shift 
towards determining employment conditions at enterprise level, and away from 
national and industry levels, there have also been ‘divergences’ in the differing rate of 
adoption of various types of employment system. The analytical challenge thrown up 
by Katz and Darbishire is to understand the increasing diversity they observe within 
national and sectoral industrial relations systems. A related challenge is to understand 
non-union employment relations. Economic conflict and the bargaining of individual 
employees has not disappeared from the 80% of the US workforce outside collective 
bargaining. These are not necessarily institutional deserts. Labour markets confer 
considerable individual bargaining power to the majority of workers. Were this not so, 
the estimates of the average mark-up associated with union-bargaining over non-union 
conditions would be considerably higher than they are1. In addition, many of the 
famous early studies of output restriction were conducted in non-union workplaces, a 
fact which explains why Hugh Clegg (1972) started his famous text book on British 
industrial relations at work group level. 
Strangely, Katz and Darbishire do not say that much about the concept of 
employment system, although they do illustrate its potential empirical richness. In 
their account, they identify about seven different kinds of system. These include 
‘Low wage’, ‘HRM’, ‘Japanese-oriented’, and ‘Joint team-based’, to which they add 
the ‘Bureaucratic non-union’, the ‘Traditional “New Deal” pattern’ and the ‘Conflict 
pattern’ when discussing the US. These differ along the dimensions of management 
                                                          
1  The evidence also shows that union bargaining achieves a bigger mark-up for low-paid 
workers. 
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control, team structures and autonomy, pay systems, skills and worker representation. 
They use this typology to measure growing diversity of employment systems as new 
types emerge, and either supplement or displace older ones. 
Another recent study, this time by two Dutch economists, Teulings and Hartog 
(1998), also calls for a reconsideration of the nature of neo-corporatist institutions. 
The institutional demise of the ‘Swedish model’, and the severe weakening of 
industry bargaining in the ‘German model’, have done much to undermine arguments 
about the economic significance of macro-bargaining and of ‘political exchange’. To 
this one should add the sensitivity of the econometric evidence on the benefits of 
corporatism to how one classifies different countries (OECD 1997). Instead, Teulings 
and Hartog address the vulnerability of the employment relationship, one of the key 
economic institutions of the industrial world, to the ‘hold-up’ problem. In essence, 
the reason the employment relationship appeals to firms is that it is an extremely 
flexible transaction. There is no need to specify its precise content in advance, which 
is a tremendous advantage when market demand is uncertain, and work processes are 
almost impossible to codify. However, as product demand shifts, firms need to re-
negotiate terms of employment. At such times, the whole relationship is vulnerable to 
breakdown because it is difficult to re-negotiate key aspects of the relationship when 
these are likely to affect to overall balance of power between both parties. Thus 
Teulings and Hartog argue that higher level institutions can provide a framework 
within which the wider bargaining power balance can be sustained while details are 
re-negotiated at the micro-level. They provide therefore a ‘bottom-up’ explanation of 
what corporatist institutions do in labour markets. 
What I should like to do in this paper is build on both studies, and to show how 
an analysis of the dynamics of employment systems can help us understand the 
shifting balance within industrial relations institutions. I treat ‘employment systems’ 
as institutional frameworks that enable firms and workers to organise their 
collaboration while protecting both parties from certain kinds of opportunistic 
behaviour. At their centre is the employment relationship. Thus, I shall argue for a re-
orientation of industrial relations theory away from macro-level institutions that seem 
to have rather less effect than was previously supposed, and towards the employment 
systems which underpin them. I shall do this by going back to the employment 
relationship itself, which is, arguably, the fundamental labour market institution of 
our day. By analysing the conditions that have to be met in order for both firms and 
workers to choose to organise their transaction within an employment relationship 
rather than some other contractual framework, I shall argue that we can account for 
the diversity of employment systems Katz and Darbishire observe. Although each 
type of employment system may be thought of as a stable equilibrium, each is 
vulnerable to breakdown under certain conditions, with the mutual benefits of a 
flexible relationship being lost. At this point in particular, wider institutional support 
plays an important part by facilitating orderly re-negotiation, in general, by making 
commitments by one side more credible to the other. I shall argue that each type of 
employment system makes certain demands on inter-firm institutions and that these 
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can influence the latter’s structure. However, we have to take a lesson from the 
diversity of workplace relations within economies and within sectors covered by the 
same macro-institutions that Katz and Darbishire observe. Within certain limits, the 
same institutional functions may be served by different institutional arrangements. 
2. The employment relationship and work rules 
The employment relationship is a remarkable social and economic institution, as 
important as the invention of limited liability for companies. It solves a very difficult 
economic question: how to enable open-ended cooperation between self-interested 
parties given that each knows more than the other about important aspects of their 
joint work, and that the gains from cooperation also imply costs of separation.  
For much of the nineteenth century, subcontracting had worked well when the 
outcomes could be easily defined and monitored2. But it reached its limits as 
technical change and increasing complexity of production meant firms wanted more 
direct control over the work process, and to tailor work tasks more closely to their 
own organisational needs. This meant getting the ability to redefine workers’ 
assignments without re-negotiation or with greatly reduced negotiation. To do this, 
they needed a new contractual form: the open-ended employment relationship. 
For workers who distrusted the intentions of potential employers, an open-ended 
contract would have seemed a recipe for exploitation, and so it would become 
acceptable only as various protections were integrated. Coase, in 1937, captured its 
essence: it gives employers the authority to define workers’ tasks ex post ‘within 
certain limits’ (Coase, 1937). These limits cannot be set by exhaustive job 
descriptions with complex contingency clauses (Williamson, 1975). Apart from the 
cost of writing such contracts, they would not work because their very detail would 
create endless scope for job-level bargaining. The solution that gradually emerged 
was to use certain kinds of transaction rules, or work rules, to identify the limits of 
managerial authority and of employees’ obligations. To be effective, such rules have 
to be simple enough to be applied by ordinary workers and their line managers, far 
from the help of personnel departments and legal advice. The earliest such rules 
tended to identify certain kinds of work tasks, either by their complementarity, as in 
the case of the ‘work post’ rule common in French and US forms of taylorism, or by 
the tools and materials associated with certain tasks, as was common under British 
and US craft demarcation rules (‘job territory’ rules). Although ‘taylorism’ was 
originally a management invention, as Crozier’s (1963) and Slichter’s (1960) field 
studies show so well, the work posts very quickly transformed into a defensive 
mechanism for workers. Defining their jobs also delimits their obligations. In more 
recent years, work rules have developed that focus on functions rather than individual 
                                                          
2.  There were of course other moral hazard problems, notably with the tendency to flog the 
entrepreneur’s capital equipment, to skimp on quality, and frequent disputes over use of raw 
materials. On the employers’ side there was a frequent reluctance to provide training (eg. 
Slichter, 1919). 
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tasks. Although they are more flexible, they also require higher levels of trust and 
more complex relationships between work groups and management. Well-known 
examples can be found in the flexible work organisation of large Japanese firms, 
where, as explained in more detail later on, the ‘competence ranking’ rule often 
guides the distribution of tasks within work groups (Koike 1997, Yamanouchi and 
Okazaki-Ward, 1997). Similarly, in Germany, the ‘qualification’ rule commonly 
assigns work according to its skill requirements (Sengenberger 1987). Both of the 
latter rules establish a much looser relationship between tasks and workers’ jobs, 
improving task flexibility, but they do so by focusing on functions related either to 
production needs or to workers’ skills. Labour law and collective agreements have 
helped reinforce these work rules. 
2.1 A typology of transaction rules 
The same four broad types of employment rule can also be derived logically 
from the requirements for a viable form of contracting. They therefore have the 
special status of ‘constitutive rules’. To do this, we need to consider the sufficient and 
necessary conditions such rules must fulfil for there to be viable relationship over 
time. I assume that firms and workers are basically self-interested, and subject to 
bounded rationality. There are also important informational asymmetries between the 
two parties, both parties face costs if they break off the relationship, and that each 
knows that the other’s interests overlap but are not identical with their own. There is 
therefore scope for either party to behave opportunistically once the relationship has 
started, and both are aware of this. 
To understand why workers and firms should voluntarily choose the 
employment relationship as the framework for their cooperation, one needs to know 
what is the alternative. The most practically and economically significant one is that 
of self-employment, where the worker operates in effect a one-person firm. Across 
the OECD countries, around one person in ten works as self-employed, and this 
covers a range of sectors and occupations (OECD 1992). From the growth of self-
employment in certain activities, and from mobility studies reviewed by the OECD, 
we can see that people do move between employment and self-employment, and that 
firms also choose between hiring people as employees and as, say, ‘consultants’. 
Historically, we know that in the nineteenth century, various forms of contracting 
predominated over employee status (Mottez 1966). We know too that tax 
arrangements also affect the choices firms make, which presumably indicates that net 
economic advantages weigh heavily in their decisions. 
The key to the relative economic advantages of one or other form of contract lies 
in the need for ex ante specification of work outcomes or tasks in the case of self-
employment, and the scope for ex post definition of a worker’s duties within the 
employment relationship. There is also a grey area in which some ex post 
specification of tasks occurs for the self-employed. However, it can be shown that 
such cases often depend upon the existence of the same kinds of work rules as those 
found in the employment relationship, notably where there are strongly developed 
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occupational skills (Marsden, 1999: Ch. 8). Enforcing open-market contracts, such as 
in self-employment, is made relatively easy because the terms of the contract are 
agreed in advance, and the parties have an interest in ensuring the degree of 
ambiguity is small. Because the agreement is ex ante there are few sunk costs. The 
situation is quite different with the open-ended employment relationship which is 
more like an agreement to work together, albeit under the employer’s direction, than a 
market exchange. Sunk costs can be considerable on both sides: at a minimum, job 
search and recruitment are expensive, and the sunk costs rise if there is significant 
investment in firm-specific skills and such like. There are great potential gains, 
particularly for employers, from the open-ended nature of the relationship. The costs 
and rigidities of defining tasks or outputs ex ante are avoided, and firms do not need 
to know the precise timing with which they will need certain kinds of work. Coase 
and Simon develop the different aspects of these benefits with great elegance in their 
two famous articles. Slichter et al (1960), and Williamson (1975), all in different 
ways, show the costs of trying to work with tightly defined tasks and work 
assignments, and Crozier (1963), also with great elegance, shows the perverse effects 
of defining work tasks in too much detail. No doubt this helps explain why, even 
though there is real choice, nine out of ten workers are engaged as employees in the 
advanced industrial economies. 
Coase puts his finger on the central problem of the employment relationship by 
saying that it gives the employer the authority to assign work ‘within certain limits’. 
Unlimited employer power would be slavery, and more important, in a liberal 
economy with a free labour market, there would be few takers. What he does not 
explore, however, is how these limits are set. Indeed, almost no one does. It is 
assumed often that there is a set of tasks between which employees are indifferent, 
and that they agree to employer discretion within this set. It is assumed employers 
might pay a supplement for tasks outside that set. However, as I show in 
‘Employment Systems’ this opens the door to opportunistic bargaining. A similar 
point is made by Teulings and Hartog (1998): the whole beauty of the employment 
relationship, for an employer, is that it insulates work assignments from further 
bargaining, and so avoids the opportunistic re-negotiation associated with the ‘hold-
up’ problem. Willman (1986) shows just how damaging continuous bargaining over 
assignments was for productivity in the British car, dock and printing industries. 
Limits to managerial authority are essential, and they can only be provided by 
some kind of rule. We need therefore to consider what are the sufficient and 
necessary attributes of such rules for a viable employment relationship: one that will 
be freely chosen over its main alternative. Taken together, these are represented by 
the efficiency and the enforceability constraints. 
A sufficient condition for workers and firms to choose to cooperate through the 
employment relationship is that it should be mutually beneficial compared with the 
alternatives. The arguments of Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) take us part of the 
way by showing the overall gains that can arise as compared with the main 
alternative, some kind of sales contract. However, it is not sufficient because it is 
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possible that one party will try to appropriate all the gains. Given the sunk costs each 
has in the relationship, the losing party may often be worse off if this happens. A 
necessary condition, therefore, is the existence of a rule that ensures both parties gain, 
in other words, that clarifies the extent of employees’ obligations to their employers 
in a way that can be enforced. Unless this can be done, then one or other party will 
refuse to engage in the relationship. However, enforceability is not enough on its 
own. Work assignments could be determined by the colour of an employee’s eyes. 
Enforceable rules must also be productively efficient, and define obligations in such a 
way that employees’ competencies match employers’ job demands. Indeed, by 
aligning these, the rule boosts the ‘added value’ of the employment relationship by 
organising the training process and job classification systems. 
Taken together, satisfying the enforceability and efficiency constraints is 
necessary and sufficient to ensure a viable employment relationship. As a result, one 
can regard the two constraints on employment rules as the basis for an exhaustive 
classification of employment rules given the basic assumptions of the Coase-Simon 
approach. Broadly speaking, employment rules may satisfy each constraint in one of 
two ways, and this founds the typology of rules shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The contractual constraints and common employment rules. 
 Efficiency constraint 
 Job demands identified by: 
Enforceability 
constraint 
Production approach Training approach 
The focus of 
enforcement criteria 
Task-centred ‘work post’ rule ‘job territory’/ 'tools 
of trade' rule 
 Function/ 
Procedure-centred 
‘competence rank’ 
rule 
‘qualification’ rule 
 
There are two broad approaches by which employment rules establish the 
enforceability of work assignments. They may focus either directly on attributes of 
individual work tasks, or on functions within the production or service process. A 
famous example of the first, widely found in craft work environments, is to identify 
the tasks belonging to particular ‘job territories’ by the tools or materials used: ‘the 
tools of the trade’. Such simple rules provide a very robust way of delimiting the 
boundaries of the jobs of one group of workers and determining where those of 
another begin. Within professional work, where distinctive tools figure less 
prominently, boundaries are often drawn by identifying key operations that must be 
undertaken only by those holding a particular qualification. Another famous rule, 
common in both blue and white collar environments, is that of the ‘work post’ under 
which tasks are grouped according to complementarities in production and assigned 
exclusively to individual work stations for which individual workers are responsible. 
Usually, neither of these rules are enforced rigidly, but the important thing is that 
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everyone knows they may be invoked should work relations deteriorate. Likewise, 
management tends to enforce work rules strictly only in periodic ‘crackdowns’ when 
effort seems to be drifting in the wrong direction. ‘Working to rule’ is a pressure 
tactic and not usually the normal method of working. 
The other approach to enforceability is to assign work tasks on the basis of 
functions. Mostly, these transcend the jobs of individual workers and so place a 
heavy reliance on stable dynamics within work groups. It can be shown that a 
seniority- or competence-based ranking rule can enable a flexible allocation of tasks 
within a work group (Marsden, 1999: Ch. 2). Similarly, recognised qualifications can 
be used to assign types of work which pose similar technical demands. With function-
centred rules enforcement is trickier than with task-centred rules, and depends on a 
higher degree of cooperation between workers and management. They are vulnerable 
to a breakdown in trust, there being no safety net of minimal compliance as under the 
task-related rules, and this vulnerability is a strong incentive for employers to behave 
cooperatively. 
To satisfy the efficiency constraint, work assignments can be organised 
according to complementarities either in production or in training. These are the 
production and training approaches. They diverge mainly because of the different 
cost structures of informal on-the-job training (OJT) and formal off-the-job 
instruction. The first has low set-up costs, but costs rise steeply as the share of 
trainees increases. The second has high set-up costs because of the investment in 
special training facilities, but falling average costs per trainee. Organising work 
according to production complementarities leads to what Williamson calls 
‘idiosyncratic’ jobs, whereas seeking to maximise the utilisation of expensive training 
causes firms to group tasks according to their training requirements. Intermediate 
forms, in between the production and training approaches, tend to be unstable, 
gravitating to one or other form over time (Marsden 1999). 
2.2 Examples of common rules under the four employment models. 
Common examples of the rules corresponding to each type are shown inside the 
boxes in Figure 1. Maurice et al. (1986) describe the operation of the work post rule 
in French industry as an ‘aggregation of tasks sharing certain technical demands’, and 
observed the frequent heterogeneity of tasks grouped into particular jobs. As in 
Cole’s (1994) account of the same system in the US, work is organised by assigning 
one person to each post and holding them individually accountable for the tasks it 
includes. It is the typical taylorist solution in production and bureaucratic services. 
The occupational job territory shares a number of features with the work post 
rule, and especially, the identification of a specific set of tasks with a particular type 
of worker. However, being based on the ‘training approach’ tasks are grouped for the 
efficient utilisation of workers’ skills. The ‘tools of the trade’ rule is a very simple 
way of identifying the tasks that belong to particular occupations, and of limiting the 
range of tasks over which management may deploy such workers. For both rules, 
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their clarity and widespread recognition make it easy to identify breaches by either 
party, and facilitate calling on the assistance of other groups covered by the same 
principle in times of conflict. 
The competence rank and qualification rules both enable the task content of jobs 
to be defined more flexibly and give rise to more diffuse job boundaries. They link 
tasks to jobs indirectly through procedures that are essential to the process of work 
and skill formation, and avoid the rigidity of the strict identification of task to job. 
Skill formation within the production approach depends on stable OJT. The 
competence rank rule regulates flexible task assignments by the way it structures the 
work group assigned to a particular function, awarding rank on the basis of technical 
and relational capabilities learned through OJT. Workers of higher rank can tackle 
more complex operations, and are expected to assist the OJT of junior workers. 
Ranking workers by the range of skills they have mastered and their seniority gives 
order to the group, and progression up through the ranks gives workers a visible 
indication of how far their abilities are recognised by management. 
The qualification rule shares some features with the competence rank rule in that 
recognised competencies provide the basis for task allocation, except that it belongs 
within the training approach, and the criterion of competence is recognised vocational 
training. This provides a procedure identifying both the skill and the person holding 
it. Under both the competence rank and qualification rules, the pressure on 
management to behave cooperatively is strong because neither system has the safety 
net of detailed job specifications that can be enforced if cooperation breaks down. 
The same rules can be shown to regulate problems of ‘moral hazard’ over the quality 
of job performance (Marsden 1999). 
These rules regulate job boundaries, but they also assist the control of working 
time and play a key role in performance management through their incorporation into 
job classification systems. They help control working time because, in team 
production, they make it hard for management to ratchet up the working time of 
individuals without doing so for the whole team. If one individual’s production rises 
faster than that of the others, it simply leads to bottlenecks, which is, after all, the 
classic problem in production management of ‘balancing the line’. It is much easier 
for management to pressurise individual employees to raise their working time if they 
can redistribute tasks, but at this point, they encounter obstacles from job boundaries. 
In performance management, the essential problem is to determine whether work 
has been to a desired standard or not. The moral hazard problem is serious. Employees 
may fear that management will manipulate performance measures in order to renege on 
agreed payments, and management may fear that workers will renege on aspects of 
quality that are difficult to monitor directly. Job contents cannot be defined by elaborate 
contingency contracts, nor can performance standards. At least, this cannot be done 
while still maintaining the flexibility and relative cheapness of the employment 
relationship. Here, job classification systems play an extremely important role. By 
classifying certain jobs as belonging to the same type, it becomes possible to establish a 
rough and ready guide to reasonable performance standards. Workers and line 
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managers can compare jobs that are classified similarly within the same organisation, 
using them as benchmarks for reasonable standards. One of the most interesting 
conclusions of Lutz’s (1976) seminal study of performance standards in piecework, 
surely the most plausible area for expecting objective standards to apply, was that such 
standards always contain a large relative component. The simplest and most robust way 
in which this can be established in a particular workplace is by identifying comparable 
types of jobs. Although there is not space to do this here, it can be shown that there is a 
close match between norms of performance management and the four types of 
transaction rules.3 This should not be surprising because they both develop under the 
same kinds of constraints. Given this, work task and performance rules work best when 
they are mutually consistent, but beyond that, one can see that management and 
workers will focus on those aspects of performance that are most vulnerable to moral 
hazard under each of the types of work rule. Thus, under the training approach, 
performance standards are strongly influenced by occupational and professional norms 
acquired during training, and under the production approach, greater reference is made 
to internal job classifications. Under the work post rule, performance standards tend to 
be more quantitative, stressing the supply of effort because many of the qualitative 
aspects are already dealt with by the delimitation of tasks (Reynaud 1992). Worker 
cooperativeness is highly stressed under functional methods of job design as this is the 
element most vulnerable to moral hazard in that kind of work system, as is widely 
observed under the systems used in large Japanese firms (Koike 1997). 
3. Regulating the employment relationship: the role of labour institutions 
The analysis so far has focused on the relationship between work rules and job-
level considerations. How do inter-firm institutions contribute to the functioning of 
such rules, and what are their effects? It is helpful to start by considering the case in 
which employment rules diffuse without the intervention of higher level institutions, 
out of the decentralised interaction of firms and workers. This will help to bring out 
the nature of employment rules in non-union environments. By showing that these are 
also institutionalised, we can break away from considering employment regulation in 
the presence and in the absence of labour institutions, and think instead of different 
types of institutional regulation, and consider the different externalities that have to 
be resolved. 
3.1 Decentralised diffusion of employment rules 
The ability of employment rules to delimit workers’ obligations to their 
employers depends very much on their robustness, that is, the ease with which they 
can be applied routinely by employees and their line managers, away from the expert 
services of the personnel division. They must be readily understood by all parties, and 
their outcomes must be fairly predictable. Rules that give rise to ambiguous outcomes 
increase the scope for opportunistic behaviour, as do rules that are too complex. In his 
                                                          
3 . This is demonstrated in the chapter on performance management in Marsden (1999). 
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study of French workplace relations, Sainsaulieu (1988) provides some very good 
examples of just how complex rules provide opportunities for manipulation and 
further negotiation, as indeed does Crozier’s account of the vicious circle of 
bureaucracy. Some of the most famous rules associated with job demarcations in craft 
work in Britain and the US were very simple, picking a familiar type of tool or 
material. Of course, these did not define the whole content of the job, but rather gave 
clear indicators of its boundaries with regard to other jobs. 
The more widely used a particular rule becomes, the more familiar everyone is 
with its working and its outcomes. Work is cooperative, and hence a whole group of 
workers and their line managers need to know how such rules function. Like the rules 
of the Highway Code when driving, one needs to know not only what one should do 
oneself in particular circumstances, but also what actions others will undertake. Only 
then can one enter a roundabout or junction with confidence, and only then will 
traffic flow freely on busy roads. Hence, the fact that a rule is widely used becomes a 
reason for adopting it compared with the alternatives. Thus, even if each of the four 
types of transaction rule were equally placed initially in a certain environment, should 
one rule happen to become more widely adopted, it would engender a cumulative 
process by which its greater familiarity would favour its further diffusion at the expense 
of the others. A second aspect follows from the logical argument earlier that there are 
only four basic types of rule, given by the combinations of the two contractual 
constraints (Figure 1). Firms are restricted in their choice for regulating the 
employment relationship by the difficulties of satisfying these two contractual 
constraints. This means that firms effectively face a fixed menu of viable types of rule. 
Thus, even in the absence of any central guidance, and relying solely on 
decentralised decisions by firms and workers, one can envisage a considerable degree 
of uniformity gradually extending across individual labour markets or sectors, or 
sometimes even whole economies. Implicit in this argument is that firms remain free 
to choose any of the four types of rules, but such freedom comes at a price. If they 
adopt a non-standard rule, they have to invest more in training people in its use, and 
they have to signal harder, and at greater expense, to their employees that they will 
stick by them. Thus, IBM could for many years practice aspects of Japanese style 
employment systems in the midst of firms that did not wish to commit to employment 
security, and that continued to use work post systems. But it had to invest more 
resources in gaining employee confidence than if it had done so in an economy in 
which such practices were the norm. Appelbaum and Batt (1994) offer a number of 
examples of the difficulties US firms face in trying to adopt ‘high performance’ work 
systems because of the externalities imposed on them by firms operating more 
traditional north American employment systems. 
US civil service reform provides a very good example of such 
‘institutionalisation’ of personnel practices (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). States that 
adopted the new system early on did so because it suited their needs. Late adopters 
did so because the norms were seen as good practice. As a result, the correlation 
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between the requirements of state administration and reform patterns that held among 
the early adopters diminished over time as other states adopted the same practices. 
Given that any of the four types of employment rule may diffuse as a result of 
decentralised management worker decisions, what role is played by inter-firm 
institutions? 
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3.2 Institutionalisation by collective action 
Collective action, whether promoted by workers, firms or the state, provides the 
other channel for diffusion of employment rules. This can occur in two ways. They 
may give a decisive advantage to one type of rule by encouraging its adoption so that 
it becomes the accepted norm. A very good example of this is shown by Jacoby’s 
(1985) study of how the US war-time administration encouraged the adoption of 
scientific management and its associated personnel systems so that the work post 
system became deeply entrenched in both union and non-union workplaces there. In 
France, the employer and union activism of the Popular Front years was decisive in 
establishing and generalising the same model there. This set the mould of established 
practice, again securing the dominance of the work post rule and incorporating it into 
job classification agreements (Jobert 1990). This type of institutional support 
primarily serves to consolidate the position of one or other of the types of 
employment rule. 
The second channel of institutional support arises from the way in which inter-
firm institutions enrich the range of sanctions either party may apply in order to 
enforce its understanding of employment rules. As mentioned earlier, Teulings and 
Hartog have shown that re-negotiation is an especially problematic time because the 
sunk costs have made the ‘exit’ option expensive. However, this is only one of a 
range of problems where inter-firm institutions can boost the flexibility with which 
the employment relationship operates. I shall consider first some of the common 
problems that arise under micro-level bargaining, and then some that arise especially 
under the training approach. In both cases, collection action plays a key role by 
involving actors outside the immediate transaction, and in doing so, it contributes to 
both the individual and the collective benefits from an effective coordination 
mechanism: the employment relationship. 
 The control of externalities in micro-bargaining 
The work rules outlined earlier solve the problem of defining the limits of 
managerial authority over work assignments, but they themselves can become the 
object of moral hazard. This can take several forms: 
 Either party may take advantage of information asymmetries to impose their 
interpretation of the rule; 
 There may be mutual gains from a flexible application of the rule, provided this 
is not used to redefine the rule itself; 
 Changing economic circumstances require that work rules be adapted 
periodically, and this has to be achieved without opening up everything for re-
negotiation; 
 Work rules will function more stably if their broad principles are codified in 
some kind of collective agreement (eg. in a classification agreement). 
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Most social rules create scope for individuals to find short-cuts which are 
attractive precisely because everyone else is observing the rule. For example, because 
people generally tell the truth, individuals can profit, at least in the short-run, by 
telling lies. But if no one respected the rule, lying would be useless, indeed, verbal 
communication would break down. Thus, workers may enter an employment 
relationship in the expectation that management will respect the spirit of certain 
employment rules only to find all sorts of pretexts being used to justify different tasks 
or higher work loads. Likewise, workers may take advantage of their greater job 
knowledge to try to pull the wool over the eyes of their managers (for some good 
examples see Roy (1952) and Burawoy (1979)). How can individual workers or 
managers enforce what they believe to be the fair interpretation? Often it is difficult 
within the confines of an individual workplace. On the other hand, if either side can 
call on the support of an outside organisation, a union or an employer’s association, 
then there is scope for escalating the dispute. This has two important implications. 
First, it increases the ability of individual work groups and managers to draw on 
additional support and so raises the potential cost of opportunistic application of work 
rules. This in itself can increase the readiness of workers or managers to accept 
particular work rules because they are more confident that a fair interpretation can be 
enforced. Second, any outside coalition would quickly dissipate its strength if it 
supported every grievance, so it is necessary to be selective. Thus, unions and 
employer organisations have every reason to make a judgement about which of their 
members’ grievances should be backed up, and which refused. They will therefore 
usually wish to discourage opportunistic claims. William Brown (1973) gives some 
nice examples of how shop steward committees refused to back what they felt were 
opportunistic claims of workplace custom by some groups which would threaten to 
undermine their overall bargaining relationship which benefited all work groups in 
the firm. Thus, inter-firm coalitions of workers and firms can contribute to the greater 
effectiveness of employment rules in two ways. They increase the confidence of 
individual groups that they can escalate their action if they believe they are being 
unfairly pressurised by the other party; and they can police the actions of their own 
members and so discourage action in bad faith. 
Support of inter-firm institutions also makes it easier for flexible application of 
rules in the workplace. One of the problems of flexible application of rules in a 
decentralised environment, especially when the rules are only partially codified, is 
that this can cause the actual content of the rule to drift over time as today’s 
flexibility becomes tomorrow’s norm. If the rule’s point of reference is embedded in 
current work group relations, then it is hard to resist this process. On the other hand, 
if there is a collective agreement, or an informal norm that applies across workplaces, 
such as could be found in craft demarcation rules, then there is an external point of 
comparison. If people know that the base-line of their cooperation will not be 
compromised by working flexibly, then it is easier to envisage doing so. 
Institutions external to the firm can also assist with adapting employment rules 
to changing economic and technical circumstances. It is very difficult for the parties 
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to engage in such negotiations at the workplace level because the outcome affects the 
applicability of the employment rules, and this affects the power of either side to 
sustain its position. It is therefore much safer for individual groups to refuse 
negotiation, or to stall, and thus to slow change. Re-negotiation of employment rules 
is much easier when supported by higher level institutions. A striking example of this 
can be found in the Dutch flexibility agreements which, once agreed at the peak level, 
created a framework for change at the local level. Visser (1998) argued that this 
enabled the very rapid spread of new practices across firms in the Netherlands 
whereas relying on decentralised renegotiation of employment terms had proved very 
slow and uneven. 
Finally, job classification rules, especially when applied across firms, aid the 
transparency of job regulation. They respond to one of the fundamental problems of 
economic organisation highlighted by Simon and Williamson. When economic agents 
are only boundedly rational, they need a language with which to handle the 
complexity of job information. This is provided by the categories of job 
classifications. In effect, these determine the agreed criteria for comparing jobs 
within and between firms. They are used for determining pay rates for different kinds 
of work, and they can be used to determine work standards by fixing the type of 
qualification required on hiring. As mentioned earlier, they can also guide people 
within organisations as to work demands and performance standards. Koike (1994) 
has shown that it is common in large Japanese firms, where job classifications are 
typically very broad, to display a ‘job grade matrix’ showing to all concerned the 
different competencies that management recognises individual workers as holding. In 
this way, workers can judge how fairly they are treated, relatively to each other, and 
management offers a gauge of its good faith in operating a flexible system. 
In his very perceptive study, Jacoby (1985) shows how central job classification 
was to the development of modern pay and performance management systems in the 
US, and in particular how they served to replace the internal contract system. This 
gives a clue as to their wider significance that has not been fully appreciated. Outside 
auction markets where people are trading for unique goods, one cannot have a set of 
prices without an equivalent set of categories to which they apply. What job 
classifications do in the first instance is to establish such categories. However, as 
Jacoby shows, they also play a critical role in personnel administration. They enable 
management to coordinate the work of the diverse range of employees within the 
organisation, to know what kinds of tasks different employees can be expected to 
perform, to what standards of performance, and at what rate of pay. 
 The control of externalities under the training approach  
The training approach to work organisation and identifying legitimate work 
assignments takes employee skills as given, and organises jobs and work assignments 
around them. The presence of occupational skills simplifies a number of job 
regulation problems as compared with the production approach because the training 
process helps to socialise workers and line managers into accepted norms of work 
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distribution and job performance.4 In her study of professionals operating within 
bureaucratic organisations, Zucker (1991) shows how their work is regulated by 
reference to professional standards, and that in cases of dispute, bureaucratic 
managers are often dependent for advice from other professionals outside the 
organisation. 
On the other hand, the training approach, and the occupational markets 
associated with it, are vulnerable to various types of free-rider action which need to 
be controlled by inter-firm institutions. As is well known, Becker (1975) predicted 
that trainees would bear the cost of training for transferable skills because their very 
transferability means employers cannot be sure of any return on their investment. 
Nevertheless, most of the empirical research on training costs for blue-collar 
apprenticeships shows that, overall, the costs borne by employers are considerable 
even when account is taken of low rates of apprentice pay and of their productive 
contribution during training. Becker would predict that under such conditions, 
employers would cut back on such training, and one would see a decline such as has 
occurred in British apprenticeship training in recent decades. 
Most of the arguments advanced by economists to explain why employers 
nevertheless pay for general or transferable training depend on the existence of some 
kind of ‘stickiness’, mostly attributed to informational problems. However, these are 
removed in the case of certified skills. Hence, the critical role of institutional 
regulation of occupational markets lies in the control of tendencies by individual 
employers to ‘defect’. Without institutional support, occupational markets are 
unstable because the greater the shortage of skills, the greater the incentives to poach 
and the less the incentives to provide general training. The decline of apprenticeship 
training in Britain compared with its continued vitality in Germany illustrates this 
process (Marsden, 1995). 
Employer provision of training for occupational skills only incurs a competitive 
disadvantage if some firms train and others do not. As a result, if high involvement of 
firms is maintained, then the temptation to free-ride is correspondingly weaker. 
Likewise, it is easier to sanction a small than a large number of free-riders. Hence, 
provided a high overall rate of training can be sustained, then it is possible to avoid 
entering a vicious circle in which employer cut-backs on training cause skill 
shortages which then raise the incentive to free-ride, engendering further shortages. 
Occupational markets also require other forms of institutional support in order to 
function. If costs are to be shared, then trainees need to be sure that employers will 
provide suitable vacancies for them, and there needs also to be a sufficient degree of 
                                                          
4  The training approach is not logically dependent upon the prior existence occupational 
markets: this was demonstrated by the way large German firms in the late nineteenth century 
organised their own internal apprenticeship training systems to make up for the inadequacies 
of the pre-existing apprenticeship system (Lutz, 1976). However, its effectiveness is greatly 
enhanced by the establishment of occupational markets, not least because they help to 
establish familiarity with certain types of work rules thus making them more robust. 
336   David Marsden: Job Regulation, the Employment Relationship, and the Organisation of Labour Institutions 
 
standardisation of training contents and standards. Thus, from both the employer and 
the employee side we arrive at the need for an institutional infrastructure to support 
the working of occupational markets, and thus, of the training approach within the 
employment relationship. 
3.3 Job and pay classification rules 
As mentioned earlier, job classification rules play a very important part in the 
employment relationship. They reduce the natural idiosyncrasy of jobs and help to 
identify contours of similarity and equivalence that have been recognised by 
management and workers as relevant to their relationship. They also identify what is 
being paid for. In view of the scope for opportunistic bargaining that Williamson 
shows can be associated with job idiosyncrasy, it is hard to imagine that in any but 
the smallest of firms an employment relationship could work without a system of job 
classification. 
Until a recent international study by Eyraud and Rozenblatt (1994), job 
classifications had long inhabited a twilight zone in industrial relations theory, as a 
rather arcane area of personnel administration. What their study shows is that the 
incidence of job classification systems is not arbitrary. Indeed, they mirror closely the 
work rules outlined here as can be shown by re-working the typology of classification 
rules Eyraud and Rozenblatt derived from their country studies. They placed job 
classification systems along an axis from systems that classify job characterstics, such 
as those common in France and the US, to those classifying worker characteristics, 
such as those commonly used in large Japanese firms, where length of service and 
individual performance ratings play a large part. They placed the systems used for 
skilled workers in Australia, Britain and Germany sometimes in the middle, and 
sometimes in a separate category, reflecting their unease at treating skill as a pure job 
characteristic or as a pure individual characteristic. Because the skills were certified 
they appeared to be more than a job characteristic, but at the same time, their strong 
occupational identity meant they were not strictly speaking an individual 
characteristic. 
Re-working their data, one can show that their classification fits that of the four 
types of transaction rules developed earlier. In fact, seniority is not really an 
individual characteristic but is rather an indicator of one’s membership position 
within a group, and the ‘merit’ half of ‘nenko’ comprises a strong element of 
cooperation and being a good work group member. The occupational skills found in 
Britain and Germany are likewise neither job nor individual characteristics. They 
match job characteristics because employers design jobs according to the supply of 
skills, and they relate strongly to particular occupations because they are based on a 
shared training process and skill norms. The British and German models of craft 
skills differ: in the former case they focus on task attributes to establish job 
boundaries, and in the latter, on the type of theoretical knowledge required by the 
work on hand. 
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There are several theoretical reasons why job classification systems should line 
up with, and incorporate the four types of work rules. The first is that the 
classification systems are classifying jobs, and if the jobs are defined according to a 
certain logic, to apply a different logic when classifying them will lead to 
inconsistencies. Thus applying the same principles will maximise their mutual 
effectiveness as a language for describing jobs and their interrelationships. Conflicts 
between the logics of the two systems would undermine the robustness of both, and 
beyond a certain point, would reduce the attractiveness of the employment 
relationship over other methods of contracting. A second reason is that job 
classification systems are in fact holistic and not atomistic. In other words, they 
proceed from a totality of work to be done, and then divide that up according to 
certain logical principles. Because they are classifying jobs, they need to apply a 
logic similar to than inherent in the job definitions themselves. 
Figure 2:  Eyraud-Rozenblatt model of classification agreements 
 
Classify jobs 
Classify 
individuals 
Attributes of job/work 
post: (eg. job 
evaluation) 
France, US 
Qualification 
Australia, Britain, 
Germany 
Attributes of 
individuals (eg. length 
of service) 
Task-based 
Function-
based 
Production 
approach 
Training 
approach 
GB 
Germany 
 
Key: the hatched lines show the categories of transaction rules; the solid line shows those of Eyraud 
and Rozenblatt. The thick shaded arrows show the amended version of the authors’ treatment of 
qualification-based classification systems. 
 
Classification systems take the principles of job regulation from the nano-level 
to the levels more commonly dealt with by company personnel systems, collective 
agreements and legal regulation. As such, they are an important step in the 
institutionalisation of transaction rules. They take us from the regulation of job 
boundaries and job performance into higher levels of institutional action. 
4. Effects on the behaviour and structure of labour institutions 
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The growing diversity of employment relations within established national and 
sectoral industrial relations systems that Katz and Darbishire observe cautions against 
any strict, one-to-one, relationship between institutional structure and the functions 
those institutions provide. Nevertheless, the theory advanced so far has implications 
for the structure of labour institutions. Each type of transaction rule involves different 
kinds of externalities which pose, in turn, different collective action problems and so 
place different demands on labour institutions. Thus, one would expect institutional 
structures to evolve in partial response to these needs. Likewise, once the labour 
institutions and transaction rules in a particular sector have evolved to match each 
other, they would provide each other with mutual support. 
In what follows, I explore the support given by collective action to the two 
contractual constraints: how they improve the enforceability of transaction rules, and 
enhance the efficiency of the match between skills and job demands. As one of the 
key goals of labour institutions is to further their members’ employment interests, one 
would expect them to evolve in ways that support the needs of the employment 
relationship. 
The most important contributions of wider, inter-firm, institutions discussed so 
far lie in the way they: 
 Provide collective sanctions to help enforce transaction and classification rules 
within the enterprise, thus making them more predictable; 
 provide the channels for re-negotiation; 
 contribute to workplace trust; and  
 support occupational and, to a lesser degree, internal labour markets. 
4.1 Institutional implications of task- versus function-centred employment 
rules. 
Taking the enforceability axis, the potential role of collective action differs 
among the function-centred transaction rules (Figure 3). The root cause lies in the 
clearer specification of workers’ job obligations, and the greater use of individual 
accountability for job performance in the former compared with greater reliance on 
work group dynamics in the latter. Under task-centred rules, individual negotiation 
remains more readily an option because of the individualisation of work obligations 
and worker accountability. In the event of a break-down of cooperative relations, 
management has a system of clear job descriptions on which it can rely to secure 
minimum performance under the threat of sanctions. 
The function-centred rules lack a comparable safety net of minimum compliance 
because they rely upon flexible interaction among work group members in order to 
fulfil functions that comprise variable task demands. In this case, work groups can be 
both a source of flexibility for management and a power base of worker opposition. 
Without the safety net of prescribed performance, management needs to enlist the 
collective support of the work force, and it cannot afford to slide into adversarial 
workplace relations. 
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Likewise, although the need for re-negotiation might arise more frequently 
under task-centred rules because individual jobs are more narrowly defined, there is, 
at the same time, greater scope for individual re-negotiation using such occasions as 
new hires, promotions and reassignments to alter job contents and performance 
standards. Under the function-centred rules, the need for such re-negotiation arises 
less frequently because of the more diffuse scope of individual workers’ jobs, but 
when it does arise, the individual option is not available. Where re-negotiation 
involves change in the way the basic transaction rules take effect, the individual 
option remains easier under the task- than the function-centred rules because change 
can be handled to a greater degree on an individual-by-individual basis. 
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Figure 3: The scope for institutional action to support task- and function-centred employment rules. 
Areas where collective 
action may restrain 
opportunism 
Task-centred rules Function-centred rules 
Handling opportunism 
over normal performance 
obligations 
Job descriptions necessarily 
incomplete & sunk costs open up 
scope for pressure from either 
side. 
Work group dynamics used for 
flexible allocation of work can be 
manipulated by management 
through peer pressures, or can be 
turned against management as a 
basis of group power. 
Re-negotiation Usually impinges on basic work 
rules so threatens the very rules 
that provide protection. The more 
sharply job boundaries are 
defined, the more frequently re-
negotiation becomes necessary. 
Need arises less frequently, but 
becomes an issue when work 
reorganisation impinges on work 
group basic structure & 
incentives & when basic 
guarantees on which flexibility is 
based are challenged. Not 
amenable to individual 
negotiation. 
Need for workplace trust Low trust requirements because 
greater specification of 
performance obligations eases 
enforcement if there is conflict, 
although more trust may increase 
flexibility. 
High trust essential because there 
is no clearly defined minimum/ 
maximum set of obligations. 
Autonomy & power of work 
group can cut both ways. 
Role of collective 
workplace representation 
Not essential because 
individualised accountability 
means individual negotiation 
always an option. 
External collective action can 
discourage opportunism under 
normal conditions & ensure re-
negotiation is bona fide. 
Necessary because jobs are linked 
to functions through work group 
organisation. 
Cooperative/adversarial 
tolerance 
Can function if work relations are 
adversarial, albeit in a more 
restrictive way. 
Need cooperative relations in 
order to function. If adversarial, 
work group can serve as a 
countervailing power base against 
management 
 
At several points, I have suggested that the transaction rules use key landmarks 
to establish job boundaries rather than detailed descriptions, and that they may often 
remain in the background rather than dictate current job contents. This is because 
their purpose is to protect against potential opportunism by the other side. This is 
different from saying that the parties will always behave opportunistically. Should 
trust develop between them, then the rules can be applied more flexibly. On the 
whole, one is much more likely to trust one’s business partner if one knows one can 
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inflict sanctions if he or she defects. Collective action, drawing in actors who are not 
party to the immediate transaction, is both an important sanction and a means of 
dispute resolution. Collective organisations have to be selective when deciding which 
members’ grievances to back, and so they also play an important role in policing the 
actions of their own members. They can therefore play an important part in 
supporting the trust needed for flexible operation of transaction rules, and in 
providing a framework within which their application can be re-negotiated, ensuring 
such re-negotiation is in good faith and is not entered with opportunistic intentions. 
Of the two types of transaction rule, the function-centred ones have the greater 
dependence on cooperative workplace trust relations, and so one would expect them 
to be the more likely to develop various forms of workplace participation. Indeed, 
they depend to a large degree upon such frameworks. The pay-off for management 
lies in the greater task flexibility, which, if well-developed, can also serve as the basis 
for effective workgroup problem-solving activities, as compared with the task-centred 
rules. 
4.2 Institutional implications for the production versus the training approach. 
Turning to the second axis, that distinguishing the production from the training 
approaches (Figure 4), one can see a second set of collective action problems that are 
likely to shape the development of labour institutions. Whereas the key problems 
underlying the enforceability constraint were those of work assignment and job 
performance, those underlying the efficiency constraint revolve around the 
recognition of skills and competencies on the employer’s side, and the willingness of 
skilled workers to pass on their knowledge on the workers’ side. 
A key difference between the production and training approaches lies in the 
different demands they make of collective action. The externalities associated with 
the training approach are fairly easy to see. The principal economies derived from 
organising work around training arise from many firms applying the same norms of 
skill formation and skill recognition and defining vacancies that match the skills on 
offer. These are conditions needed for successful occupational labour markets. While 
there is a strong shared benefit from their existence over the long-term, firms may 
undermine this by their short-term actions, for example, by reducing the transparency 
and transferability of the skills they form in order to restrict subsequent mobility by 
their skilled workers. Occupational markets are also vulnerable to a break-down in 
the sharing of training costs between the firm and its trainees. In such cases, firms 
often bear a disproportionate part of the cost, and this sets in motion incentives for 
firms to poach those trained by others. Cost sharing rests on there being adequate 
institutional protections for skilled workers: that it should not lead to trainees acting 
as a source of substitute cheap labour, and that trainees should have the prospect of an 
adequate supply of suitably defined job vacancies. On the employers’ side, there 
needs to be protection against free-riding by employers who cut their own training 
and take advantage of common skill norms in order to poach. All of these pressures 
point towards institutional arrangements that span many firms operating within the 
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same occupational labour markets, and thus to institutions providing horizontal 
coordination. Good examples can be found in craft and professional labour markets, 
and in the system of local employer organisations in Germany, the chambers of 
industry and commerce, that oversee vocational training and provide channels for 
peer group pressures on recalcitrant employers.5 
Figure 4: The scope for institutional action to support the production and training approaches 
Areas where collective action 
may restrain opportunism  
Production approach Training approach 
Handling opportunism over 
skills and competencies 
Production approach brings job 
and skill idiosyncrasy which 
makes skill recognition 
problematic. Often dealt with 
by proxy measures eg. 
seniority. 
External occupational norms 
and standards protect skill 
recognition & skill 
performance. 
Re-negotiation Primary focus on the firm 
unless it uses inter-firm job 
and skill classifications 
Re-negotiating occupational 
norms necessarily involves 
many collective actors. 
Need for workplace trust To facilitate passing of firm-
specific skills to new hires 
To facilitate training of 
apprentices and acceptance of 
cost-sharing by trainees 
Role of collective representation Inter-firm classifications help 
to clarify criteria of 
skill/competence definition 
within the firm. 
Secure observance of external 
professional / occupational 
norms 
Collective action problems Short-term adaptation at 
individual firms weakens 
shared inter-firm classification 
principles. 
Short-term individual gains by 
free-riders undermine 
occupational market integrity 
 
For the production approach, the externalities are less in evidence owing to the 
emphasis on adapting skills to firms’ production or service technologies which 
greatly reduces the need for inter-firm cooperation. Nevertheless, it can assist firms 
operating the production approach, in very much the same way that it assists those 
using task-centred transaction rules. By adapting skills to the firm’s technology rather 
than setting out from the logic of skill acquisition and formation, the production 
approach easily leads to idiosyncratic skills. As such, they are vulnerable to 
opportunism at job level, and can also prove very difficult to renegotiate. Inter-firm 
action, for example in establishing common principles of job classification, can ease 
these processes. The jobs themselves may still be shaped by the technologies used by 
individual firms, but the conditions for skill recognition, upgrading, and pay are 
                                                          
5  According to Ingrid Drexel, the chambers publish pass lists by local firms for different types 
of apprenticeship and these make transparent to all not only how many are being trained, but 
also how many to the appropriate pass standard. 
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shared with other firms. This facilitates action by outsiders in resolving disputes, and 
eases problems of renegotiation because individual jobs can be changed and 
redesigned without changing the general principles regulating them. If the principles 
themselves need changing, then the greater number of actors involved by working on 
an inter-firm basis increases the likelihood of negotiation in good faith: to adapt to 
changing market demands, rather than simply to take advantage of temporary 
weaknesses of the other party. 
This kind of inter-firm action has a different focus from that for occupational 
skills. Given the greater influence of individual firms’ technological demands on the 
content of skills, the classification systems will tend to focus on general criteria 
relating to all types of jobs in the firm rather than on regulating occupations. As such, 
the needs of the production approach are more easily accommodated by industrially 
or sectorally-based labour institutions whereas the those of the training approach are 
best supported by occupationally-based ones. 
4.3 Combining the two contractual constraints: what institutional patterns? 
If we combine the two contractual constraints, we can trace out the implications 
of the theory for the patterns of worker-employer representation, shown in Figure 5. 
The demands for strong workplace representation are greatest for the two function-
based rules. In fact, strong workplace guarantees for workers would seem to be a 
necessary condition for the success of function-based rules, and under most 
circumstances, strong inter-firm coordination is necessary for the success of the 
training approach.6 Collective action is beneficial but not essential in the other cases. 
Thus, in large Japanese firms, which combine the function-based and production 
approaches, a very active form of enterprise unionism predominates. In large German 
firms, works councils play a key role dealing with a large number of job-related 
issues. French works councils provide an interesting counter-example. Using the 
task-centred work post rule, French firms have had a lesser need for close workplace 
cooperation. Also, for much of the post-war period, political competition among the 
unions and a weak membership base have meant that works councils have not been 
able to play the same role in France as in Germany. So, as Lorenz (1995) observes, 
French works councils have been more conflictual and less effective than their 
German counterparts. 
Turning to the production versus the training approach, we can see that strong 
inter-firm representation exists in Germany and provides much support to its blue and 
white collar apprenticeship systems. Particularly important are the institutions that 
assist coordination among employers. Britain provides an interesting counter-
example here. For decades it had a successful apprenticeship system and lively 
occupational markets, but their decline in the 1970s and 1980s owed much to the 
                                                          
6  Logically, the training approach can exist within a single firm, as appeared to be the case 
when the large industrial firms in Germany took over and modernised the apprenticeship 
system in the late nineteenth century. However, the model soon extended across firms. 
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weakness of the institutional framework on which they depended (Marsden 1995). 
Weakness of employer coordination led to greater reliance on task-centred rules to 
keep the system going. These were keenly defended by craft union organisation, 
albeit increasingly from special occupational sections within more general unions. 
These rules constrained many employers to train apprentices because they could not 
easily substitute other workers for apprentice-trained skilled workers. This proved a 
considerable economic handicap to the firms, and so their interest in apprenticeship 
declined, heralding its virtual collapse from the mid-1980s. 
At first sight, the industrial pattern of German union organisation might also 
seem to be at odds with the argument. However, as Sengenberger (1987) has shown, 
a great many occupational skills covered by apprenticeship are specific to certain 
industries, particularly when one considers the very broad scope of industries and 
sectors in German union and employer organisation. Thus, although German unions 
are ‘industry’ unions in terms of their scope, unlike unions with similar coverage in 
other countries, they give a remarkable power to occupationally skilled workers 
whose special status is enshrined in classification and in wage agreements. The 
agreements are very specific on just how far workers without an apprenticeship may 
progress towards skilled status on the basis of on-the-job training. Again to compare 
with France, although German unions nominally have similar membership coverage 
to French industrial unions, they represent skilled workers in a completely different 
way, stressing occupational principles against the strong internal labour market logic 
to be found in France. 
Finally, although inter-firm representation may not be essential to the workings 
of the production approach, there are good examples of how it can improve its 
flexibility. In France, where the work post system has wide currency, industry 
classification agreements have provided a framework for renegotiating skill norms in 
the enterprise (Eyraud et al., 1990). Likewise for Japan, Cole’s (1989) study of the 
spread of quality circles, as a result of coordinated action between firms, illustrates 
how such action can promote greater job flexilibility. Although the movement was 
led by employers, Cole argues that it developed the momentum of a ‘mass 
movement’ as a result of informal coordination among firms which was not achieved 
in the US. In the final section, we turn to look at employment relationships in the 
weakly institutionalised environment of non-union firms. 
Figure 5: The four types of transaction rule and patterns of worker-employer representation 
 Inter-firm representation 
Work place representation Weak Strong 
Weak Work post Job territory rule 
Strong Competence rank Qualification rule 
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4.4 The work post model and ‘non-union’ workplaces 
Because of its lesser need for collective action, the work post model is the one 
most likely to flourish in weakly institutionalised and non-union workplaces. There, 
the problems of asymmetric information, bounded rationality and partially divergent 
interests still need to be resolved, and transaction rules remain essential to the 
employment relationship. 
The likely dominance of the work post system rests on two observations. First, 
one would expect the task-centred rules to be the type preferred by workers. These 
provide more clearly defined job responsibilities and work roles, and so enable 
workers more easily to identify potential pressures from their line managers to extend 
their jobs. It is also easier for workers to monitor performance management if work 
obligations are relatively codified. Function-centred rules are unlikely to appeal 
because employees’ work obligations are too open-ended. Secondly, the absence of 
collective organisation among both employers and employees makes it less likely that 
stable occupational markets will emerge. This will push firms towards the production 
rather than the training approach. Taking these together, one would expect the work 
post type of rule to predominate. It is the one that best handles the problems of 
opportunism within the employment relationship in the absence of strong labour and 
employer institutions. Thus, the absence of a suitable collective framework would 
help explain the uneven development and slow diffusion in the US of the ‘American 
models of high performance’, and the persistence of taylorist models of organisation 
there (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994, but also Katz and Darbishire 1999). 
Like the other types of employment rule, the work post system can be 
administered with varying degrees of flexibility. It was argued earlier that collective 
action can facilitate flexible working, and most importantly, assist with re-negotiation 
of work organisation principles. In their absence, firms and workers still have to 
adjust to shifting markets, so what mechanisms are open to them? 
First, one would expect employees to minimise their investments in the firm 
because these tie them and expose them to opportunistic re-negotiation by their 
employers. If they cannot afford to quit, then they are in a weak bargaining position. 
In the absence of collective bargaining, a worker’s best protection is a job offer from 
a rival employer. As a result, one would expect workers to leave firms to shoulder a 
greater part of investments in skill development, and for firms therefore to privilege 
firm-specific skills. 
Secondly, there are alternative, individual, routes to re-negotiating work 
assignments. For career workers, firms can link this to promotion, using it as an 
opportunity to alter work assignments, but they must also increase pay. Firms may 
also have to be more specific about promotion opportunities when they hire workers 
into such an environment because the latter are less likely to believe open-ended 
promises when the employer faces fewer checks and balances. In this respect, it is 
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significant that Baron et al. (1986) found that non-union firms had more structured 
job ladders than union ones. 
Thirdly, firms can use the process of labour turnover to adjust work roles by 
individual negotiation, except that such negotiation occurs through the arrival of new 
hires. This can be important because careers provide incentives to only a small 
percentage of workers. According to Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991: 222) nearly 
30% of employees in the US had been hired during the previous year, as against 
about 20% in the UK and around 10% in France7. A year’s figures provide only a 
rough indication, and one needs to remember too that the US economy also contains a 
significant proportion of long-term jobs. Nevertheless, it does suggest that heavy 
reliance on individual negotiation may lead to more rigid job assignments that in turn 
lead to shorter job tenures, and the associated recruitment and training costs for 
employers. 
Finally, generalised individual re-negotiation of jobs may require the firm 
periodically to declare a ‘state of emergency’, for example associated with 
downsizing in response to bad stock market performance. However, this can prove a 
double-edged. As Bewley’s (1999) recent study shows, even in the US, many 
employers are reluctant to announce job cuts because, although they may generate 
concessions, they may also cause employee morale to collapse. 
5. Conclusion 
To use Cole’s expression, labour institutions are ‘loosely coupled’ with 
employment systems. The different types of transaction rules do place different 
requirements on the capacity of labour institutions to support them, and to handle the 
externalities associated with them, as shown in the previous section. Katz and 
Darbishire were impressed by what they saw as the increasing diversity of employment 
systems within established industrial relations frameworks at the national and sectoral 
levels. Thus, a first question is whether, and at what point, increased diversity, or a 
major change in the mix of employment systems in a given sector or economy would 
provoke a switch in the nature of higher-level labour institutions. This would also 
reveal how loosely coupled the two levels are in practice. A second question concerns 
the limits on the amount of diversity possible over the longer run. 
Katz and Darbishire observe three general tendencies that could cause labour 
institutions to switch. The first concerns whether some firms might abandon function-
centred rules and the training approach and so abandon the higher-level institutions 
associated with them. This is the question currently asked about Germany and Japan 
with regard to the encompassing nature of their employment systems. Should firms 
concentrate the flexible and high skill function-centred systems on those activities 
where their contribution to productivity is greatest? Do firms operating in Germany 
and Japan that produce only standardised products really need the sophisticated 
                                                          
7  The data relate to 1988 which was a period of low unemployment in between the peaks of 
1982-83 and the early 1990s. 
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employment systems of those working on technically advanced goods and services? 
If they do not, should they then abandon these expensive systems which require large 
investments in training and in employment security, and opt for older style taylorist 
patterns? If they were to do that, would they need to continue to work within the 
mainstream employer and union organisations, or could they even take the non-union 
path? Katz and Darbishire give evidence from both economies of a decline in 
unionisation, and a shrinkage of collective bargaining coverage. What we lack is 
good evidence at the micro-level on whether the hitherto dominant employment 
systems are also in retreat. 
The second observation concerns the growth of cooperative industrial relations 
and ‘social partnership’. The British TUC and some of its leading member unions are 
not alone among national union organisations to recognise the benefits of a 
partnership approach over their previous adversarial relations. There have been 
similar moves among leading French and Italian unions. In Britain, the collapse of the 
apprenticeship system in Britain has been associated with a shrinking of sections of 
the work force covered by job territory type rules. With that has come an increase in 
flexible deployment of labour across long established job boundaries, and a general 
erosion of occupational unionism, especially within private sector industry. Also in 
Britain, Katz and Darbishire highlight the growth in certain areas of function-centred 
work organisation, under the influence of close collaboration with Japanese firms and 
the arrival of Japanese multinationals in the automobile industry. Indeed, within that 
industry, one of the most striking changes has been at Rover where, in recent years, 
the development of more function-centred work organisation has gone hand in hand 
with policies to foster long-term employment and management-union partnership. In 
France too, firms have been trying hard to break from the work post system and 
introduce functional patterns of work organisation, but in the early days found it very 
difficult to achieve within the current framework of top-down and adversarial 
relations. Workers were simply too distrustful of management (Baraldi et al. 1995). It 
remains to be seen whether the current wave of working time agreements under the 
auspices of the Aubry laws will provide sufficient momentum to generate a shift in 
the pattern of union-employer relations that corresponds to the changes firms are 
seeking at the micro-level. 
Their third observation, the growth of non-union employment relations, also 
raises questions about what is happening at the level of employment systems, and 
whether firms are opting for, or to remain with, work post systems. In Britain, many 
firms have shifted away from the training approach, with the decline of occupational 
skills, and towards the production approach. Despite talk of greater flexibility which 
sounds like a move to function-centred work organisation, there remains the strong 
possibility that they have remained with the task-centred rules, and have really moved 
to the work post system. The spread of non-unionism would reflect its low 
requirements for workplace trust, and its low demands on institutional support. 
There is also a question as to the amount of diversity that is possible. Here, the 
theory of employment systems makes a strong prediction. There are four basic types 
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of transaction rule that will determine the shape of employment systems, and 
provided workers and firms wish to organise their relations within the employment 
contract, then they will face a fixed menu of options. This fact, plus the externalities 
mentioned in this article will generate large areas of uniformity as people seek to 
tackle problems in similar ways. The changes observed by Katz and Darbishire may 
not signal convergence, but rather, a continuously shifting pattern of dominance by 
different types of employment rule which will from time to time lead to a major 
reconfiguration of higher level institutions. 
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